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ABSTRACT: We use a linked employer-employee data set from Germany to estimate 
the wage effect of foreign-affiliates in East and West Germany. In addition, the wage 
effects of the large number of West German affiliates which are located in East 
Germany are also considered. The implemented techniques allow us to control both 
for worker- and plant-level unobserved components of earnings. We find large 
selection effects both in terms of worker and firm unobserved components of wages. 
The selection effect is larger for East German plants. Once it is taken into account, 
the genuine takeover effect is small and in some cases insignificantly different from 
zero. In contrast to the selection effect, the takeover effect is slightly larger in West 
Germany, where it amounts to 2.7 %. 
 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG: Mit einem deutschen kombinierten Betriebs-Beschäftigten-
Datensatz wird analysiert, ob Betriebe im ausländischen Eigentum höhere Löhne 
zahlen. Auch werden Lohndifferentiale von ostdeutschen Betrieben in 
westdeutschem Eigentum untersucht. Die verwendeten Schätzmethoden erlauben 
es, für jeweils unbeobachtbare Personen- und Betriebsheterogenitäten zu 
kontrollieren. Bezüglich beider Komponenten werden große Selektionseffekte 
gefunden, wobei diese für ostdeutsche Betriebe größer sind. Der verbleibende 
(wahre) Übernahmeeffekt ist gering und teilweise nicht signifikant von Null 
verschieden. Im Gegensatz zum Selektionseffekt ist der Übernahmeeffekt etwas 
größer für Westdeutschland, wo er 2,7% beträgt. 
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1 Introduction
There is now an extensive literature which suggests that a±liates of foreign-owned ¯rms
outperform domestic ¯rms and pay higher wages. However, as often noted (e.g. Girma,
Greenaway & Wakelin 2001) much of this di®erence may be due to di®erences in other
characteristics of ¯rms which are correlated with foreign ownership. For example, a±liates
of foreign-owned ¯rms tend to be larger and operate in sectors of the economy which are
inherently more productive. It is therefore important to control for ¯rm size and sectoral
distribution when comparing the wages and productivity of foreign and domestic ¯rms.
Since these characteristics are often observable in plant- or ¯rm-level data, controlling for
these di®erences is straightforward in a regression framework.
A potentially more di±cult problem is that foreign and domestic ¯rms might di®er
in their unobservable characteristics. In particular, ¯rms which are taken into foreign
ownership might already be outperforming ¯rms which are not taken over. With repeated
observations at the plant-level, it is possible to remove the in°uence of any ¯xed di®erence
between ¯rms which become foreign-owned and those which remain domestic by using
di®erence-in-di®erences (DiD) or ¯xed e®ects (FE) techniques. However, it is di±cult
with plant-level data to control for di®erences in the quality of the workforce which may
explain some of the apparent foreign-ownership wage premium.
In this study we use a large linked employer-employee data set for Germany for the
years 2000 and 2004, and provide estimates of the wage e®ects of foreign-a±liates in
(the former) East and West Germany. In addition, the wage e®ects of the large number
of West German a±liates which are located in East Germany are also considered. The
implemented techniques allow us to control both for worker- and plant-level unobserved
components of earnings.
In the light of the recent literature on policy evaluation, we think of a change in
ownership as a \treatment" which potentially a®ects the wage paid to workers in the
plant. This allows us to partition the wage gap between di®erent types of plant in terms
of \selection" and \takeover". Selection re°ects the fact that plants are not randomly
selected into their ownership status. Takeover measures any additional wage gain which
a change in ownership status yields.
This framework is also helpful in investigating whether any wage gain from ownership
status is internalised within the ¯rm, or whether there are spillovers to the domestic
economy. We can do this by examining the wage changes of workers who move from
foreign-owned to domestic plants, and by examining the wage changes of plants which
revert to domestic control.
The use of data on workers and ¯rms also allows us to investigate whether there are
any distributional consequences of ownership status. For example, foreign-owned ¯rms
may implement a steeper wage-tenure pro¯le, or they may change relative rewards to
di®erent skill groups.4
We ¯nd evidence of large selection e®ects both in terms of worker and ¯rm unobserved
components of wages: plants which get taken over by foreign ¯rms have higher plant-level
wages and higher individual-level wages before they are taken over. The selection e®ect
is larger for plants in East Germany. Once the selection e®ect is taken into account, the
genuine takeover e®ect is small and in some cases insigni¯cantly di®erent from zero. The
takeover e®ect is slightly larger in West Germany.
The paper is structured as follows. We summarise previous estimates of the wage
e®ect in Section 2, and we present a framework for measuring wage e®ects in Section 3
which explores the di®erent empirical issues which may arise. Section 4 brie°y describes
the data we use, and our estimates are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Previous estimates
As noted, there is now a wide range of estimates of the wage impact of foreign a±liates. As
always, it is di±cult to make direct comparisons across these studies because of di®erences
in methods, samples, data and so on. Nevertheless, Appendix Table A.1 attempts to draw
together the relevant comparisons for as many studies as possible.
As can be seen, the 18 studies have been carried out for various developed and devel-
oping countries. They have been conducted either at the industry- or ¯rm-level and more
recently | as employer-employee data have become available | at the individual-level.
The studies can also be broadly classi¯ed according to the identi¯cation of the ownership
wage premium. The ¯rst group compares wages (or wage growth) between foreign-owned
and domestically-owned plants, which is typically carried out by OLS. In this case, one can
condition on human-capital and plant-characteristics available in the respective data-set,
but not on unobservables. Hence, the obtained ownership e®ect may be confounded by a
selection e®ect if foreign- and domestically-owned ¯rms di®er in unobserved characteris-
tics. To circumvent this problem, some studies identify the wage di®erential by comparing
the change in wages of plants which change ownership and the change in wages of plants
which do not. This is achieved by ¯xed-e®ects or di®erence-in-di®erence methods, by
which unobserved time-invariant di®erences between both plant-types are swept away.
Obviously, this is only possible if the data cover more than one period in time.
By analogy, if the analysis is based on a panel of linked employer-employee data
(LEED), one can compare the wage growth of workers who experience a change in their
employer's ownership status with the wage growth of workers whose employer's ownership
status does not switch. A reported change in ownership status at the individual-level
can occur for two reasons. First, the plant for which an individual works changes its
nationality. Second, the individual moves to another plant with a di®erent ownership
status. While Martins (2006) and Heyman, SjÄ oholm & Tingvall (2004) use the former (and
explicitly rely on workers staying in the same ¯rm) to identify the ownership di®erential,5
the studies of Pesola (2006) and Balsvik (2006) are based on movement of workers.1 To
the best of our knowledge, no study derives (and contrasts) separate estimates of the
ownership wage di®erential based on the two alternative sources of ownership variation.
Some of these studies only investigate the e®ect of becoming foreign-owned (Martins
(2006), Heyman et al. (2004), Girma & GÄ org (2006)) or restrict the e®ects of going from
domestic to foreign and of going from foreign to domestic as being equal and opposite
(Earle & Telegdy (2006)). Conyon, Girma, Thompson & Wright (2002) is the only study
at the plant level which also considers the e®ect of changing from foreign- to domesti-
cally owned, although their control group comprises ¯rms of both ownership types not
changing their status. Balsvik (2006) looks separately at both directions of movement at
the individual-level. In separate regressions, she compares movers to non-multinationals
(MNE) and movers to MNE with stayers. The reference group comprises in the ¯rst case
stayers in non-MNE and in the second case stayers in MNE. Pesola (2006) speci¯es a re-
gression model which includes a foreign ownership dummy and its interaction with tenure
and which allows the impact of previous experience to vary with the ownership of the
previous and the current employer (such that there are four groups: domestic-domestic;
domestic-foreign; foreign-domestic and foreign-foreign).
There is a common consent from all studies that foreign-owned ¯rms pay higher wages.
The premium appears to be much larger in less developed countries (the reported (raw)
wage di®erential amounts to 65% for Ghana and ranges in Indonesia even between 67 and
90%), but lies for developed countries at least somewhere between 10 and 30%. We can
also regard it as a stylized fact that the di®erential reduces after including human capital
variables of the workers and/or characteristics of the ¯rm (of which sectoral a±liation
and ¯rm size seem to be the most important). Nevertheless, if unobserved factors are
not taken into account, a positive foreign wage di®erential remains. This is typically
around 10% and the di®erence between developed and less-developed countries is much
less pronounced. There is, of course, some variation between countries, but this may at
least partly re°ect di®erent sets (or qualities) of control variables. However, studies which
also account for unobserved factors often ¯nd no or only a very small wage premium.
It is often found that the foreign ownership wage di®erential rises with skill (Feenstra
& Hanson (1997) for Mexico, Earle & Telegdy (2006) for Hungary, Lipsey & SjÄ oholm
(2004) for Indonesia, Velde & Morrissey (2001) for sub-Saharan countries).2 According
to GÄ org, Strobl & Walsh (2002), one explanation for this is that ¯rm speci¯c training is
more productive in foreign ¯rms. Using data for Ghana, the authors can provide evidence
for their hypothesis by distinguishing between whether individuals work in domestic or
foreign-owned ¯rms, and whether they receive on-the-job training. Relatedly, Pesola
(2006) obtains that the positive wage e®ect of prior experience in foreign-owned ¯rms is
driven by the e®ect on the earnings of highly educated.
1 Earle & Telegdy (2006) also uses LEED data, but in their data workers cannot be tracked over time
due to the omission of workers' identi¯cation codes.
2 This is not supported, however, by the ¯ndings of Buckey & Enderwick (1983) and Girma & GÄ org
(2006) for the UK.6
In this paper we clarify the appropriate methodology for estimating the wage e®ect of
foreign ownership when one has access to linked employer-employee data. We provide more
comprehensive evidence consistent with the idea that foreign-owned ¯rms \select" high-
wage plants and high-wage workers. We also present some evidence consistent with the
idea that wage gains in foreign-owned plants may\spill over"to workers' subsequent jobs.
3 Measuring direct wage e®ects of MNEs
Let yit be worker i's wage in period t. There are only two waves, t = 1 (namely 2000) and
t = 2 (2004). The sample for these models is all workers who are observed twice. In each
period, the identity of a worker's plant is given by j = J(i;t). Note that the ownership
status of worker i's current plant may change either because the worker moves from one
plant to another of di®erent ownership status, or because the plant itself changes status.
The simplest framework in which to consider the wage e®ects of ownership is a standard
linear two-way error components model:
yit = z
0
it¯ + ±Fjt + ¸t + µi + Ãj + "it; t = 1;2: (1)
The vector of observable characteristics z could be partitioned into those which vary
across individual workers, and those which vary across individual plants. The variable Fjt
is unity if the worker's plant is foreign-owned and zero otherwise. ¸1 and ¸2 are standard
macro e®ects.
Following Abowd, Kramarz & Margolis (1999), µi and Ãj represent unobserved com-
ponents of wages which are time-invariant at the individual- and plant-level respectively.
µi might be thought of as \unobserved ability", while Ãj might be related to the unob-
served ¯xed productivity of a particular plant, if we think that more productive plants
pay higher wages. As both might be correlated with foreign ownership, we have a two-way
¯xed-e®ects model.
De¯ning the treatment and comparison groups
A natural interpretation of a foreign ownership takeover is that of a\treatment". In other
words, we wish to estimate the e®ect on average workers' wages in domestic ¯rms in t = 1
of becoming foreign-owned in t = 2. Similarly, we wish to estimate the e®ect on average
workers' wages in foreign ¯rms in t = 1 of becoming domestically-owned in t = 2. Some
models (such as a standard ¯xed-e®ects model) suggest that these two e®ects should be
equal and opposite, in which case we could pool the two types of takeover. But we do not
wish to impose this restriction because it is possible, for example, that the wage bene¯ts
of foreign takeover are not reversed when plants revert to domestic control. We therefore
consider these two cases separately.7
Thus de¯ne the ¯rst treatment group to be those workers which are in domestic plants
at t = 1 and which are in foreign-owned plants at t = 2. The comparable control group are
those workers which remain in domestic plants at t = 1 and t = 2. There are analogous
treatment and control groups consisting of those workers in foreign-owned plants at t = 1.
In what follows we consider only the ¯rst comparison.
Controlling for di®erences in µi
Keeping only those individuals who are in domestic plants at t = 1, if we di®erence
Equation (1) we can remove the individual-level ¯xed e®ects:3
¢yi = ¢z
0
i¯ + ±Fj2 + ¸ + (¢Ãj + ¢"i); (2)
where ¢yi = yi2¡yi1, ¢z0
i = z0
i2¡z0
i1, ¢Fjt = Fj2, ¸ = ¸2¡¸1, ¢Ãj = ÃJ(i;t)¡ÃJ(i;t¡1) and
¢"i = "i2¡"i1. For workers who do not change plant, ¢Ãj = 0. Now drop the observable
covariates and it is easy to see that the OLS estimator of ± is the \raw" di®erence-in-
di®erence estimator,
± = ¢¹ yT ¡ ¢¹ yC; (3)
where ¢¹ yT is the change in average wages of workers who are in the treatment group
(those that become foreign-owned) and ¢¹ yC is the change in average wages in the control
group. Equivalently, ± is the average wage of workers in foreign-owned plants relative to
those in domestic-owned plants in t = 2 net of the gap between the same workers in t = 1,
when they were all in domestically-owned plants. In these models ± is identi¯ed by those
workers whose Fjt changes. As noted, this occurs either if a plant changes ownership
status or if a worker moves to a plant of another status.
It has been suggested that foreign-owned ¯rms might be more selective in recruitment
(e.g. Dale-Olsen 2003), and employ workers with higher µi, so that E(µ j F = 1) > E(µ j
F = 0). We label this a worker selection e®ect.4 As just shown, with panel data on
individuals it is straightforward to control for µi by di®erencing.
To actually obtain an estimate of the di®erential ¹ yT ¡ ¹ yC at t = 1, an alternative
formulation of the di®erences-in-di®erences estimator is given by:
yit = z
0
it¯ + ±Fjt + °Ti + ¸2 + Ãj + ºit; t = 1;2: (4)
Here the time-invariant dummy variable Ti is equal to one if the worker is in the treatment
group and zero otherwise. When covariates are absent, this gives an identical estimate of
± above, but has the advantage that ° gives an estimate of the selection e®ect discussed
above.5
3 With T = 2, di®erencing and mean-deviating are identical methods.
4 Equivalently, workers might have been more productive already before they move to a foreign-owned
plant.
5 While workers observed once would not contribute to the identi¯cation of the parameters in (2), we8
A variant of this model is to ¯x covariates at their t = 1 values, because one might
argue that some observables might themselves respond to potential foreign ownership
e®ects.
Controlling for di®erences in Ãj
OLS estimates of (2) will yield consistent estimates of ± if FJ(i;t)t is uncorrelated with
¢Ãj. However, although we have a rich set of covariates (particularly at the plant level),
and we can di®erence out µi, it seems likely that foreign ownership is non-random with
respect to unobservable plant-level determinants of wages. This is because foreign-owned
¯rms might also select into plants which have some unobserved productivity advantage
so that E(Ãj j F = 1) > E(Ãj j F = 0). With panel data on plants one can eliminate the
Ãj in the same way as we did for µi by collapsing the individual-level data to a plant-level
panel, and estimate:
¹ yjt = ¹ z
0
jt¯ + ±Fjt + ¸t + ¹ µjt + Ãj + ¹ "jt:
¹ yjt is the average wage paid in plant j at time t etc. Now take ¯rst di®erences to get:
¢¹ yj = ¢¹ z
0
j¯ + ±Fj2 + ¢¸t + ¢¹ µj + ¢¹ "j; (5)
where, for example, ¢¹ yjt = ¹ yjt ¡ ¹ yjt¡1. By analogy with the above, having controlled for
observables, ± is the di®erence-in-di®erence estimator
± = ¢¹ yT ¡ ¢¹ yC;
where now ¹ y refers to plant-level sample means.
Controlling for both selection e®ects
The problem with aggregating the data to the plant-level to di®erence out plant-level
¯xed e®ects is that estimates of ± from (5) will now be biased if ¢¹ µj is correlated with
Fjt. This is so-called aggregation bias, caused by the selection e®ect we cannot control
for with plant-level data.
One advantage of linked employer-employee data is that one can eliminate both µi and
Ãj together. To do this, de¯ne a spell, denoted s, as a unique worker-plant pair. So a
worker who changes plant between 2000 and 2004 has two separate spells. Within a spell
both µi and Ãj are constant (because both i and j are constant) and so one can eliminate




i¯ + ±Fj2 + ¸ + ¢"i: (6)
could (additionally) utilize these observations to estimate (1). However, using repeated cross-sections
to obtain a di®erence-in-di®erence estimate relies on stronger assumptions (Lee & Kang 2006).9
Note that, when estimating Equation (6), individuals who change plant are not in-
cluded in the regression and therefore do not contribute to the estimates of ±. Therefore
one way of thinking about spell-¯xed e®ects (FE(s)) is that it controls for plant-level un-
observables by only looking at\stayers". This is why Equation (2) contains the term ¢Ãj
whereas Equation (6) does not. This is, in fact, essentially the same method suggested
by Martins (2006).6
Because (6) ignores information on movers, it is not the most e±cient estimate of ±
(or any other parameter). In addition, one cannot recover separately estimates of µi or
Ãj. An alternative method would be to estimate (2) but include a full set of (di®erenced)
¯rm dummies to control for non-random selection on Ãj. However, this method is likely
to be computationally infeasible since we have many thousands of plants. A solution
to this problem is to use the Classical Minimum Distance (CMD) estimator outlined in
in Andrews et al. (2006). It forms a restricted estimator for ¯, ±, ¸ and Ã from the
parameters of (2) and (6) estimated separately.7
To summarise, if (1) represents the true process by which wages are generated, one
can obtain consistent estimates of the foreign-ownership on wages using: (2) if ownership
is non-random with respect to µi; (5) if ownership is non-random with respect to Ãj; and
(6) if ownership is non-random with respect to µi and Ãj. More e±cient estimates can
also be obtained using a CMD estimate which combines both movers and non-movers.
All of the above is repeated for all foreign-owned plants in t = 1, some of whom become
domestic (the second treatment group) in t = 2.
4 The data and descriptive statistics
There are two data sources. The ¯rst is the Institut fÄ ur Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung
(IAB) Establishment Panel, an annual survey of approximately 8,250 plants located in the
former West Germany and an additional 7,900 plants in the former East Germany. The
survey started in 1993 and is ongoing. It covers 1% of all plants and 7% of all employment
in Germany, and is therefore a sample weighted towards larger plants. Information is ob-
tained by personal interviews with plant managers, and comprises about 80 questions per
year, giving us information on, for example, total employment, bargaining arrangements,
total sales, exports, investment, wage bill, location, industry, pro¯t level and nationality
of ownership. Ownership is de¯ned as either West German, East German, foreign, or
public.8 Complete information on plant ownership is available for all plants only in 2000
and 2004, so we restrict our analysis to those years. A detailed description of the IAB
panel can be found in KÄ olling (2000).
6 Also note that, in the tables below, we decompose the OLS DiD/FE estimates into those for Movers
only and Stayers only.
7 See Wooldridge (2002, ch. 14.6) and Andrews et al. (2006) for further details.
8 The relevant question is: \Is the establishment mainly or solely in: (a) West German ownership (b)
East German ownership (c) Foreign ownership (d) Public ownership (e) No single owner which holds
majority?" Our analysis considers only plants under (a)-(c).10
Table 1 summarises the basic sample which we use for the analysis.9 Only a small
proportion of plants in Germany are foreign-owned: 4% of all plants in West Germany
and just 2% of all plants in East Germany are foreign-owned. A higher proportion of
plants in the service sector are foreign owned. Turning to the employment shares, foreign
ownership becomes more important. Almost one out of eight employees in West Ger-
man manufacturing works for a foreign-owned plant because foreign-owned plants are on
average larger.
Table 1: Incidence and coverage of di®erent forms of ownership
(percentages).
West Germany East Germany
Manuf. Services All Manuf. Services All
Share of plants
West German-owned 97.9 95.0 95.8 9.1 12.6 11.4
East German-owned 0.1 0.2 0.2 89.7 85.0 86.5
Foreign owned 2.1 4.8 4.0 1.3 2.5 2.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Share of workers
West German-owned 87.8 92.7 90.5 28.7 27.2 27.9
East German-owned 0.1 0.2 0.1 63.0 69.1 66.3
Foreign-owned 12.1 7.1 9.4 8.3 3.7 5.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes: Source: IAB Establishment Panel; 2000 and 2004; weighted ¯gures.
As we would expect, there is almost no ownership of West German plants by East
German ¯rms.10 By contrast, there is considerable cross-border ownership of East German
plants by West German ¯rms. About 11% of plants in East Germany are West German-
owned and the share of workers employed by theses establishments is nearly 30%. In the
light of this considerable fraction, wage e®ects of West German-owned (as compared to
East German-owned) plants in East Germany will also be of particular interest in the
econometric analysis below.
The second source of data is the employment statistics register of the German Federal
O±ce of Labour (BeschÄ aftigtenstatistik), which covers all employees or trainees registered
by the social insurance system. The register covers about 80% of employees in West
Germany and about 85% in East Germany. Information on employees includes basic de-
mographics, start and end dates of employment spells, occupation and industry, earnings,
quali¯cations (school and post-school), and a plant identi¯cation number. A detailed
description of the employment data can be found in Bender, Haas & Klose (2000).
By using the plant identi¯cation number we can associate each worker with a plant
in the panel. We therefore observe approximately 80% of all workers in about 14,000
plants each year. Because the employment register is spell-based (one record for each
employment spell), the combined data are potentially complex. To simplify, we select
all employees in the employment register who are employed by the surveyed plants on
9 We exclude plants in agriculture, banks and insurances, education, health and the public sector.
10 In our analysis we therefore exclude East German-owned plants in West Germany.11
June 30th each year. This yields an unbalanced annual panel of employees together with
detailed information on the plants in which they work. We refer to the linked data as the
Linked IAB panel, or LIAB.
Reported daily gross wages are censored at the social security contribution ceiling.11
Using wage data without any correction would generally yield estimates which are biased
towards zero. One way to circumvent this problem is to apply a single imputation proce-
dure, i.e. to impute all censored wages with estimated wages. Assuming that daily gross
wages have a log-normal distribution, ¯rst a Tobit model is estimated, where the depen-
dent variable is log daily gross wage and the independent variables are those included
in further analyses. Then, for every censored observation a random value is drawn from
a normal distribution which is left-truncated at the social security contribution ceiling
(with predicted log wage as its mean and standard deviation as estimated from the Tobit
model).12
Because the plant-level information in our data come from a survey, rather than an ad-
ministrative source, we have a large number of measurable covariates, shown in Table B.1.
We have rather less information on workers, shown in Table B.2.
5 Results
All our estimates can be thought of as variants of the basic di®erence-in-di®erences es-
timator described in Section 3. The basic model is an extension of Equation 4, which
allows us to directly estimate both the selection e®ect and the takeover e®ect.
De¯ne the following dummy variables to measure the ownership status of a worker's
plant in period t:
EJ(i;t)t = 1 if worker i is in an East German-owned plant in period t, 0 otherwise
WJ(i;t)t = 1 if worker i is in an West German-owned plant in period t, 0 otherwise
FJ(i;t)t = 1 if worker i is in a foreign-owned plant in period t, 0 otherwise
In West Germany we ignore EJ(i;t)t = 1, and therefore we have only two treatment





1 if FJ(i;1)1 = 0 and FJ(i;2)2 = 1





1 if FJ(i;1)1 = 1 and FJ(i;2)2 = 0
0 if FJ(i;1)1 = 1 and FJ(i;2)2 = 1
11 The ceiling is in 2000 at e 143.92 for West and at e 118.81 for East Germany. In 2004, the respective
¯gures are e 166.10 and e 114.30. In our regression sample, 12.1 (5.5) % of the wage observations
from 2000 in West (East) Germany are censored, while in 2004 10.9% (4.5%) of workers are a®ected.
12 See Gartner (2005) for further details.12




it¯ + ±FFjt + °WFTWF + ¸2 + "it (7)
for plants which are domestic at t = 1, and
yit = z
0
it¯ + ±WWjt + °FWTFW + ¸2 + "it (8)
for plants which are foreign-owned at t = 1.
For plants in East Germany there are six possible treatment and control groups. For
example, TEW de¯nes the group of plants who are domestic at t = 1 and become West
German, while TEF de¯nes the group who become foreign. Similarly we have TWE and
TWF for plants which are West-German at t = 1 and TFE, TFW for plants which are
foreign at t = 1. The three DiD equations for East Germany are therefore
yit = z
0
it¯ + ±WWjt + ±FFjt + °EWTEW + °EFTEF + ¸2 + "it (9)
for plants which are domestic at t = 1,
yit = z
0
it¯ + ±EEjt + ±FFjt + °WETWE + °WFTWF + ¸2 + "it (10)
for plants which are West German-owned at t = 1 and
yit = z
0
it¯ + ±EEjt + ±WWjt + °FETFE + °FWTFW + ¸2 + "it (11)
for plants which are foreign-owned at t = 1
The number of workers and plants for the di®erent treatment and control groups in
our regression sample is shown in the Appendix Tables C.1 and C.2, which also stratify
between plant-stayers and movers. Each row in Table C.1 represents a control group and
the associated treatment group for West Germany, while each row of Table C.2 comprises
information on a control group and the corresponding two treatment groups for East
Germany.
The dummy-variable TWF, for example, takes on the value of zero for the control
group of 146,482 employees in West Germany, working for West German-owned plants
in both years. 139,858 of these stay in the same (1,503) plants which are West German-
owned in 2000 and in 2004. The remaining 6,624 move between West German-owned
establishments. While stayers work for plants which are |by construction| observed in
as well in 2000 as in 2004, this is not necessarily the case for movers. The group of the
(6,624) movers worked for 1,238 plants which are either observed in 2000 or 2004 and for
122 plants which are included in the regression sample in both years.
The corresponding treatment group (i.e. TWF = 1) consists of 12,426 workers whose
employing plant is West German-owned in 2000 and foreign-owned in 2004. The observed13
change can occur for two reasons: First, 11,976 stayers work for 36 plants which are
taken over between 2000 and 2004; and second, 450 workers move from West German-
owned to foreign-owned establishments. The estimated selection and takeover e®ects are
identi¯ed by both types of workers. In contrast to previous studies, which relied either on
stayers or on movers, in the analysis below we compare results based on the two sources
of ownership-change.
5.1 West Germany
The ¯rst panel shows the raw di®erence-in-di®erence (DiD) estimate (Equation 3), which
can be estimated either using OLS or ¯xed e®ects (FE). Our ¯rst basic result is that
domestic ¯rms which are taken over pay signi¯cantly higher wages before they are taken
over. This is the coe±cient on TF, estimated at 0:115 log-points. Similarly, foreign-owned
¯rms which become domestic pay lower wages (¡0:061) before they become domestic,
but this e®ect is insigni¯cantly di®erent from zero. There is then an additional boost to
wages of 0:043 log points after foreign takeover. This result is almost mirrored by ¯rms
which switch from foreign to domestic (¡0:038 log points). In the raw data therefore,
foreign ¯rms appear to take over higher-paying domestic ¯rms, but also boost wages after
takeover. Foreign-owned ¯rms which revert to domestic ownership do not pay signi¯cantly
lower wages, but wages do drop signi¯cantly afterwards.
The raw DiD estimate controls for permanent di®erences in wages between plants
which change ownership status and those that do not. These large di®erences (estimated
to be about 10%) may in part be due to di®erences in observed characteristics, which we
call xit and wjt. For example, ¯rms which get taken over may be larger or in higher-paying
industries. Incorporating a full set of time-varying controls in the basic DiD regression (as
expected) reduces the estimate of °WF from 0:115 to 0:056. Interestingly, the estimate of
°FW for plants which change from foreign to domestic changes sign and becomes positive
and signi¯cant. In the raw data there appears to be negative selection: lower-paying ¯rms
switch from foreign to domestic. But this is due to time-varying di®erences in xit and
wjt. The inclusion of covariates also reduces the takeover e®ect a lot: it reduces to 0.025
log points for switching from domestic to foreign, and it is virtually zero for plants which
become domestic.
As has been noted above, because this is an individual-level wage equation, the esti-
mates of ±F and ±W are driven both by plants which change their ownership status and
by individuals who switch between plants of di®erent ownership status. If movers are
non-random with respect to ownership status, this might bias our DiD estimates. It is
straightforward to control for this by looking at wages only of individuals who remain in
the same plant. This reduces the takeover e®ect for plants which switch from domestic to
foreign slightly (0:021 log-points), while the e®ect is larger for movers (0:055 log-points).13
13 The overall DiD estimate is a weighted average of the movers' and non-movers' estimates. As can
be seen from Table C.1, only a small fraction of the sample comprise movers (4.6 % of the employees14
Table 2: Results for plants in West Germany
Domestic in 2000 Foreign in 2000
Individual level Plant level Individual level Plant level
Raw DiD/FE
°WF 0:115 (0:044) 0:226 (0:058) °FW ¡0:061 (0:062) ¡0:086 (0:101)
±F 0:043 (0:016) 0:040 (0:009) ±W ¡0:038 (0:020) ¡0:000 (0:019)
OLS DiD, conditional on covariates
°WF 0:056 (0:020) 0:015 (0:034) °FW 0:030 (0:016) 0:006 (0:035)
±F 0:025 (0:008) 0:025 (0:013) ±W ¡0:002 (0:016) ¡0:005 (0:021)
OLS DiD, conditional on covariates, Stayers only
°WF 0:046 (0:020) 0:010 (0:033) °FW 0:030 (0:019) 0:010 (0:035)
±F 0:021 (0:009) 0:029 (0:016) ±W 0:006 (0:015) ¡0:007 (0:021)
OLS DiD, conditional on covariates, Movers only
°WF 0:022 (0:017) °FW ¡0:010 (0:019)
±F 0:055 (0:029) ±W ¡0:019 (0:027)
OLS DiD, covariates ¯xed at t = 1,Stayers only
°WF 0:043 (0:019) 0:007 (0:033) °FW 0:048 (0:018) 0:020 (0:032)
±F 0:041 (0:017) 0:045 (0:012) ±W ¡0:014 (0:010) 0:005 (0:021)
FE(i), conditional on covariates
±F 0:029 (0:008) 0:037 (0:011) ±W ¡0:008 (0:009) 0:003 (0:017)
FE(s), raw
±F 0:041 (0:017) 0:045 (0:012) ±W ¡0:014 (0:010) 0:005 (0:018)
FE(s), conditional on covariates
±F 0:027 (0:009) 0:040 (0:013) ±W ¡0:011 (0:010) 0:003 (0:016)
CMD, conditional on covariates
±F 0:027 (0:009) ±W ¡0:011 (0:010)
Notes: reports estimates of (7) and (8). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Further
covariates are those listed in Appendix Tables B.1 and B.2.
With respect to the change from foreign to domestic, the takeover e®ect is insigni¯cantly
di®erent from zero for both, stayers and movers. However, the positive selection e®ect is
only observed for stayers.
It has been suggested that foreign-owned ¯rms pay higher wages because they provide
greater investment in human capital. If this human capital was general, the wage e®ects
of foreign-ownership should \spillover" into the domestic economy when workers move
from foreign-owned to domestically-owned establishments. Hence, we would expect to
see smaller wage losses for movers from foreign to domestic plants than wage gains for
movers from domestic to foreign. In fact |keeping in mind the relatively low number of
movers| there is evidence for this in the conditional DiD estimates.
The model estimated above allows the covariates to vary between 2000 and 2004. A
change in ownership status, however, may cause changes in wages and changes in the
observable characteristics of the plant. For example, a plant which becomes foreign-
in West Germany working for West German-owned plants in 2000).15
owned may grow larger and pay higher wages. By including xit and wjt in the regression
we incorrectly \control for" these changes. The alternative is to measure covariates only
at t = 2000. This of course is only meaningful by looking at individuals who remain
in the same plant. The estimated e®ect of becoming foreign-owned rises again to 0:041
log-points.14
A generalisation of the DiD framework allows for individual-speci¯c unobserved per-
manent components of wages, or unobserved ¯xed e®ects, labelled µi. As we have a
balanced panel (at the individual level) between t = 1 and t = 2 the average value of µi
is constant for the treatment and control groups, and so the raw ¯xed e®ects estimator
gives identical estimates as the OLS DiD.
Using DiD or FE methods we can control for time and person-level ¯xed e®ects. We
can additionally control for plant-level ¯xed e®ects by using spell-¯xed e®ects (6). In
fact, without covariates using spell-¯xed e®ects is equivalent to using information only on
stayers because for stayers ¢Ãj = ÃJ(i;t) ¡ÃJ(i;t¡1) = 0. So the FE(s) results are identical
to the stayers only model. Conditioning on covariates, we ¯nd that foreign takeover of
domestic ¯rms does boost wages, but only by about 0.027 log-points, or 2.7%. This is
smaller than the selection e®ect for stayers. Domestic takeover of foreign ¯rms appears to
have a smaller, negative and statistically insigni¯cant e®ect of ¡0:011. However, given the
relatively large standard errors on these two estimates, we cannot reject the hypothesis
that the e®ect of takeover is equal and opposite. Thus, some of the e®ect on wages appears
to be an e®ect which is gained when ¯rms become foreign and is lost when they become
domestic.
The ¯nal row reports estimates from our Classical Minimum Distance (CMD) method.
This method controls for both individual- and plant-¯xed e®ects, and (unlike spell-¯xed
e®ects) includes both movers and non-movers. Reassuringly, we ¯nd that the CMD esti-
mates are almost identical to the spell-¯xed e®ects estimates, and so our preferred esti-
mates appear robust to the choice of method.
As noted in Section 3, it is also possible to estimate wage e®ects at the level of the
plant. This is useful not least for comparison with the existing literature. Our estimates
of the selection e®ect are generally bigger in the raw data (0.226 and ¡0:086). Without
covariates the individual-level estimates are just a re-weighting of the plant level estimates,
with larger plants having a higher weight. This shows that the selection e®ect is bigger
for smaller plants. We would therefore expect that the inclusion of covariates (including
¯rm size) in the plant-level estimates would reduce the selection e®ect, and this is indeed
what happens.
14 In fact, this speci¯cation means that xit is a ¯xed e®ect, and so this estimator gives identical
estimates of ±F and ±W as the raw DiD for plant-stayers.16
5.2 East Germany
The East German results are more complex because there are three treatment/control
groups, and two possible treatments for each group as shown in Equations (9){(11). In
Table 3 we report the two selection e®ects and the two takeover e®ects for each possible
group at t = 1.
The raw DiD estimates show ¯rst of all that the selection e®ect for domestic plants in
2000 is much larger than in West Germany. Plants which change from domestic to West-
German pay 0:195 log-points more than those who remain domestic; plants which become
foreign even pay 0:310 more. Once these large selection e®ects are taken into account,
the takeover e®ect on wages is small and insigni¯cantly di®erent from zero. Selection
e®ects for West German-owned and foreign-owned plants in 2000 are much smaller and
insigni¯cantly di®erent from zero. Once again, the large selection e®ects for domestic
plants which become foreign or West-German is consistent with the idea that higher-
paying plants are those which get taken over. The selection e®ects reduce when covariates
are taken into account (second panel), but remain substantial.15
The third and fourth panels show that these selection e®ects di®er widely between
stayers and movers. Workers who remain in the same plant have even larger selection
e®ects, while they are insigni¯cantly di®erent from zero for workers who move. Note
however that the selection e®ect is large and negative (albeit poorly determined) for
movers from plants which were foreign-owned in 2000.
Our preferred estimates for the takeover e®ect are those which control for both worker
and ¯rm-¯xed e®ects, labelled FE(s). In almost every case we ¯nd small and insigni¯cant
e®ects. The only exception is a fall of ¡0:053 log points for West German-owned plants
which become domestic. Thus, we ¯nd that while selection is greater in East Germany,
there is actually less evidence that takeover has any additional e®ect on wages.
15 It is also consistent with a model in which the e®ects of foreign ownership on wages take a long time

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.3 Selection e®ects at the ¯rm-level and the individual-level
Using the preferred ¯xed-e®ects methods, such as FE(s) or CMD, means that the parame-
ter identifying the selection e®ect is not directly estimated. For example, in Equation (6),
the treatment dummy T is swept away by the within-spell transformation. However, using
CMD we can recover estimates of both the worker and the ¯rm ¯xed component of wages,
denoted µi and Ãj. This allows us to compare their mean or their distribution between
the treatment and control groups of each type.
In Figure 1 we plot the distribution of our estimates of Ãj and µi for the control and
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(b) Worker e®ect ^ µi
Figure 1: Estimated distribution of unobserved ¯xed wage components, West German
plants
In both cases, as we would expect, we ¯nd that the distribution of the ¯xed unobserved
component of wages for the treatment group lies to the right of that for the control
group. This is another way of showing the selection e®ect, but one which decomposes
the selection e®ect into two components: one relating to the ¯rm, and one to the worker.
The di®erence in the mean of ^ µi is about 0:16 log-points, while the di®erence in ^ Ãj is
about 0:058. In both cases, foreign takeover is associated with higher ¯xed worker- and
plant-level characteristics, although it seems that the worker-level e®ect is quantitatively
more important.16
16 Plant e®ects are only plotted for establishments which are observed twice. The di®erence in the
distributions of the worker e®ects does not depend on whether only stayers, only movers or (as in
the ¯gure) all workers are inlcuded.19
5.4 Heterogeneity in the foreign ownership e®ect
Even if the average e®ect of changing ownership status is small, it might be that this
disguises some larger or smaller e®ects for subgroups in the data. For example, foreign-
owned ¯rms might implement a steeper wage-tenure pro¯le, or might reward highly-
skilled workers relatively more. The e®ects of foreign-owned ¯rms might also vary by
¯rm characteristic, such as size and pro¯tability. A further bene¯t of linked employer-
employee data is that we can disaggregate the foreign ownership e®ect by both worker
characteristics and ¯rm characteristics.
To enable comparison of a large number of coe±cient estimates, we use graphical
methods. In Figure 2 we plot the estimate of ±F for each sub-group of the data, together
with its 95% con¯dence interval. For reference we also draw vertical lines showing the
FE(s) pooled estimate of ±F = 0:027 and the null hypothesis ±F = 0. The subgroups
we choose are based on those covariates described in Appendix Tables B.1 and B.2, and
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Figure 2: FE(s) estimates of ±F, West Germany, plants which are West German-owned
in 2000
Figure 2 enables us to see at a glance that con¯dence intervals for almost all sub-groups
of the data include the pooled estimate, and most also include zero, which partly re°ects
the fact that the pooled estimate itself is only 0:027 with a standard error of 0:009. Thus
we ¯nd little evidence that takeover e®ects are much larger or much smaller for subgroups
of the data. The only notable exceptions are for workers in service occupations and for
¯rms in the service sector, where there is evidence of larger takeover e®ects. The coe±cient
on ±F for service sector ¯rms, for example, is 0:060. Thus, foreign ¯rms do not appear to
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Figure 4: FE(s) estimates of ±W, East Germany, plants which are East German-owned
in 2000
In Figure 3 we repeat the exercise, but look at the takeover e®ect from domestic to
foreign in East Germany. As Table 3 shows, our preferred pooled estimate for the ±F is
e®ectively zero (0:011), and most sub-groups have con¯dence intervals which include zero.21
Exceptions are workers in engineering and managerial occupations, which have much
larger takeover e®ects, and workers in ¯rms with high levels of exports.
Finally, Figure 4 plots estimates and con¯dence intervals for the West German takeover
e®ect. Once again, there is very little evidence here that takeover e®ects are signi¯cantly
di®erent from zero for any subgroup of the population, with the exception of one occupa-
tional group (professionals). Taken as a whole, these results con¯rm that once selection
is taken into account, the true takeover e®ect is small for most groups.
6 Conclusion
We have shown how the treatment-e®ects framework can be used to estimate the \selec-
tion" and \takeover" components of the wage gap between foreign and domestic ¯rms.
With linked worker-¯rm data it is possible to use this framework to isolate the e®ects of
selection on both plant and worker unobservable components of wages.
We ¯nd evidence of large selection e®ects both in terms of worker- and ¯rm unobserved
components of wages: plants which get taken over by foreign ¯rms have higher plant-
level wages and higher individual-level wages before they are taken over. The selection
e®ects are larger for East German plants, both for those which change to West German
ownership and foreign ownership. Once the selection e®ect is taken into account, the
genuine takeover e®ect is small and in some cases insigni¯cantly di®erent from zero. In
contrast to the selection e®ect, the takeover e®ect is slightly larger in West Germany.
The framework we use also distinguishes between ¯rms which change ownership status
from domestic to foreign and vice versa. Most previous studies impose the restriction that
these two e®ects are equal and opposite, as they would be if there was a simple wage bonus
paid to workers in foreign-owned ¯rms. In West Germany the takeover e®ect is 2.7% in
one direction and ¡1:1% in the other direction. However, the latter is insigni¯cantly
di®erent from zero, suggesting that workers do not su®er a signi¯cant wage loss when
their ¯rm reverts to domestic ownership. In addition, workers who leave foreign-owned
plants and join domestic plants do not experience wage falls (as opposed to a wage increase
of 5.5% for employees who leave domestically-owned plants and join foreign-owned). This
evidence is supportive of the idea that foreign-owned ¯rms might o®er spillover bene¯ts
to the domestic economy.
The use of linked data on workers and ¯rms allows us to investigate whether there are
any distributional consequences of ownership status. We split the sample by a number
of possibly relevant characteristics and re-estimate the takeover e®ect. We ¯nd little
evidence that takeover e®ects are much larger or much smaller for subgroups of the data.
In particular, there is no systematic pattern in terms of skill or occupational groups:
foreign-¯rms do not appear to change the reward structure within ¯rms signi¯cantly once
selection e®ects are accounted for.22
One interpretation of these results is that the true impacts of ownership structure
on the labour market are small, at least in Germany in the 21st century. A second
possibility is that wage e®ects take a long time to manifest themselves. What we call
the selection e®ect is not distinguishable in our data from the long-run e®ect on wages of
foreign-ownership.23
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Table B.1: Plant-level sample means by location and ownership status
West Germany East Germany
West Foreign East West Foreign
size Number of employees 284:601 590:581 38:237 150:450 236:558
| Mining, energy 0:012 0:016 0:011 0:019 0:025
ind2 Food 0:044 0:027 0:039 0:041 0:067
ind3 Consumer goods 0:070 0:072 0:035 0:039 0:049
ind4 Producer goods 0:127 0:293 0:162 0:220 0:252
ind5 Investment goods 0:205 0:313 0:212 0:319 0:356
ind6 Construction 0:127 0:025 0:217 0:079 0:092
ind7 Trade 0:196 0:122 0:143 0:159 0:074
ind8 Transport & communications 0:042 0:037 0:033 0:018 0:025
ind9 Catering 0:026 0:019 0:022 0:005 0:006
ind10 Business services 0:125 0:056 0:091 0:084 0:037
ind11 Other services 0:025 0:019 0:035 0:016 0:018
| Population >500,000 (central) 0:283 0:353 0:097 0:124 0:147
urban2 Population >500,000 (outskirts) 0:060 0:047 0:039 0:062 0:037
urban3 Population 100,000-500,000 (central) 0:189 0:200 0:130 0:175 0:178
urban4 Population 100,000-500,000 (outskirts) 0:141 0:109 0:124 0:117 0:110
urban5 Population 50,000-100,000 (central) 0:022 0:014 0:044 0:037 0:061
urban6 Population 50,000-100,000 (outskirts) 0:063 0:054 0:152 0:127 0:117
urban7 Population 20,000-50,000 0:110 0:113 0:171 0:172 0:153
urban8 Population 5,000-20,000 0:090 0:085 0:122 0:101 0:098
urban9 Population 2,000-5,000 0:027 0:016 0:072 0:045 0:067
urban10 Population <2,0000 0:016 0:010 0:048 0:040 0:031
single Plant not part of larger ¯rm 0:710 0:282 0:947 0:557 0:503
B1 Sectoral bargaining agreement 0:611 0:691 0:266 0:388 0:534
B2 Firm-level bargaining agreement 0:060 0:080 0:075 0:128 0:123
inv Investment (relative to median) 148:899 355:623 16:258 81:403 157:100
conc Her¯ndahl concentration index (3-digit) 0:005 0:012 0:005 0:009 0:015
| Pro¯ts \very good" 0:047 0:080 0:038 0:048 0:067
pro¯t2 Pro¯ts \good" 0:282 0:291 0:283 0:327 0:380
pro¯t3 Pro¯ts \Satisfactory" 0:342 0:280 0:370 0:342 0:276
pro¯t4 Pro¯ts \Just su±cient" 0:202 0:188 0:191 0:162 0:172
pro¯t5 Pro¯ts \Bad" 0:127 0:161 0:118 0:122 0:104
vin Age of plant (years) 18:371 17:751 8:599 8:361 8:687
exp Proportion of exports in total sales 0:121 0:354 0:028 0:102 0:267
No. of observations 4;136 515 2;212 872 163
No. of plants 2;632 401 1;257 574 11734
Table B.2: Individual-level sample means by location and ownership status
West Germany East Germany
West Foreign East West Foreign
wage Daily wage in e, reported 104.246 114.421 61.572 80.005 83.055
wage Daily wage in e, imputed 107.288 120.774 61.908 81.616 84.321
female Female 0.170 0.182 0.269 0.235 0.235
foreign Foreign 0.098 0.125 0.002 0.006 0.006
age Age 41.898 41.855 42.772 43.129 43.129
| Without apprenticeship or Abitur 0.171 0.203 0.020 0.043 0.043
qual2 Apprenticeship, no Abitur 0.671 0.596 0.803 0.759 0.759
qual3 No apprenticeship, with Abitur 0.005 0.006 0.002 0.002 0.002
qual4 With apprenticeship and Abitur 0.028 0.027 0.019 0.022 0.022
qual5 Technical college degree 0.050 0.071 0.044 0.064 0.064
qual6 University education 0.042 0.074 0.050 0.066 0.066
qual7 Education unknown 0.033 0.022 0.061 0.045 0.045
| Basic manual occupation 0.320 0.378 0.260 0.335 0.335
occ2 Quali¯ed manual occupation 0.220 0.155 0.332 0.218 0.218
occ3 Engineers and technicians 0.160 0.198 0.102 0.126 0.126
occ4 Basic service occupation 0.088 0.051 0.100 0.125 0.125
occ5 Qual¯ed service occupation 0.014 0.003 0.020 0.005 0.005
occ6 Semi-professional 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.007 0.007
occ7 Professional 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.003
occ8 Basic business occupation 0.041 0.045 0.039 0.027 0.027
occ9 Quali¯ed business occupation 0.131 0.121 0.111 0.113 0.113
occ10 Manager 0.018 0.041 0.031 0.042 0.042
tenure Tenure in years 12.444 11.544 7.585 8.097 8.097
No. of observations 309,889 87,697 27,405 50,056 17,155
No. of individuals 163,407 52,311 15,628 28,145 10,34835
C Regression Sample
Table C.1: West Germany. Number of workers (number of
plants observed in one year{in two years).
Ownership in 2004
Stayers Movers
Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign
Ownership in 2000
Domestic 139,858 11,976 6,624 450
(0{1,503) (0{36) (1,238{122) (397{3)
Foreign 3,754 34,975 745 411
(0{20) (0{114) (366{4) (161{21)
Notes: All workers included in both years.
Table C.2: East Germany. Number of workers (number of plants observed
in one year{in two years).
Ownership in 2004
Stayers Movers
Domestic West Foreign Domestic West Foreign
Ownership in 2000
Domestic 11,533 953 179 244 113 25
(0{955) (0{23) (a) (215{8) (152{1) (40{0)
West 2,077 21,656 1,875 129 255 249
(0{49) (0{298) (0{23) (143{0) (174{8) (61{0)
Foreign 358 797 6,798 17 41 9
(a) (a) (0{46) (28{0) (53{1) (12{0)
Notes: All workers included in both years.
a Total number of plants in cell too small to report.   
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